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GONZALES V CARHART:
NO LIMITS TO WHAT CONGRESS MAY NOW "FIND"
M. KATHERINE BURGESS*
In April 2007, the Supreme Court of the United States in
Gonzales v. Carhart reversed the Court of Appeals for the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits and affirmed the constitutionality of the Partial Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 ("the Act") passed by President George W.
Bush.' The Act bans a procedure, commonly known as partial birth
abortion (also known as "D&X" or "D&E").2 During a partial birth
abortion, the doctor delivers the fetus until either the head or the entire
fetal trunk except for the head is outside the mother's body, at which
time the physician punctures the fetus' skull and removes the brains,
killing the fetus. 3 In designing the Act, Congress relied on scientific
findings that suggest the procedure is never medically necessary to
preserve the health of the mother and, in fact, poses serious long-term
risks to her well-being.4 Therefore, Congress concluded that a health
exception to the partial birth abortion prohibition is not required.5 The
Court's unquestioning deference to congressional findings is contrary
to Court precedent, which indicates that Congress is afforded less
deference when it seeks to overturn the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Constitution or circumvent a constitutional rule. 6 However, even
under the most deferential standard, which requires that Congress draw
reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence,7 the Gonzales
Court failed to recognize that, according to the Congressional Record
itself, the medical consensus Congress used to justify the lack of a
health exception simply does not exist.8 As a result, the Court allowed
Congress to create a law that ignores Court precedent and infringes on
* University of Maryland School of Law J.D. Candidate, 2009. College of William & Mary,
B.A., 2006. I would like to thank my family for constantly challenging and supporting me. I
dedicate this Article to my father, who contributed immeasurably to my intellectual
development.
1. 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1639 (2007).
2. Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 153 l(b)(l) (Supp. III 2003).
3. Id.
4. Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2, 117 Stat. 1201,
1204-06 (2003).
5. Id. at 1203.
6. See, e.g., City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
7. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I1), 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997); Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994).
8. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcrofl, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1026 (N.D. Cal.
2004).
328 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 8:327
the power of the judicial branch as established in Marbury v.
Madison .9
I. THE CASE
On November 5, 2003, President George W. Bush signed the
Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act into law. The Act prohibits a
physician from "deliberately and intentionally" delivering a fetus until
either the entire head or, in the case of a breach position, the fetal trunk
past the navel is outside the mother's body and then killing the fetus
before delivering it fully. 1 In two separate actions against the United
States Attorney General, physicians who performed this procedure,
commonly known as ",partial birth abortion," sought to enjoin
enforcement of the Act. In both cases, the United States district
courts issued permanent injunctions, which the Courts of Appeals for
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits affirmed. 13
In Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, plaintiff physicians sought
an injunction against enforcement of the Act on the grounds that: (1)
the Act is overbroad and may be construed to prohibit pre-viability
abortion procedures, dilation and extraction ("D&E") and induction,
creating an undue burden on a woman's choice to have a pre-viability
abortion; 14 (2) the Act is void for vagueness, providing insufficient
notice to physicians of prohibited conduct by failing to define "partial
birth abortion" in medical terminology;' 5 and (3) the Act is
unconstitutional because it fails to provide an exception for
preservation of the health of the mother.' 6 The district court agreed
with the plaintiffs and found the Act unconstitutional on all three
grounds.'
Specifically, with respect to the absence of a health exception,
the court found that the Supreme Court in Stenberg v. Carhart
established the health exception requirement as a "constitutional
9. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
10. Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. III 2003).
11. Id. § 1521(b)(1).
12. Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 960; Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d
805, 814 (D. Neb. 2004).
13. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1191 (9th Cir. 2006);
Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 804 (8th Cir. 2005).
14. Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 968.
15. Id. at 975.
16. Id. at 979.
17. Id. at 1034-35.
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fact."' 18 When the legislature attempts to supersede a constitutional
fact, its factual findings are not accorded the same deference as other
legislative actions, such as economic regulations.' 9 Therefore, the
Stenberg Court expanded its analysis beyond the facts of that
particular case to the state of medical studies and opinions that existed
at the time, which included part of the Congressional Record for the
Act.2° However, even applying a "substantial deference" standard, the
district court found that "Congress ha[d] not drawn reasonable
inferences based on substantial evidence" and therefore needed to
provide an exception for the health of the mother in the Act." The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the
Congressional Record itself clearly denies the existence of the medical
consensus required under Stenberg to omit a health exception.
22
Similarly, in Carhart v. Ashcroft, four doctors challenged the
constitutionality of the Act on the grounds that, inter alia, it lacked an
exception for the health of the mother.23 The District Court issued a
permanent injunction against enforcement of the Act, agreeing that a
health exception is required to pass constitutional muster.24 Even
though the court recognized that congressional findings are afforded
considerably less deference where, as here, Congress seeks to alter a
judicial decision, the court held that Congress's factual findings should
be given binding deference if the findings are reasonable and
supported by substantial evidence. 25 According to the court, however,
Congress's conclusion that there is a medical consensus that the partial
birth abortion procedure is never necessary to preserve the health of
the mother not only is unsupported by the trial record, but also is not
supported by the Congressional Record.26 Therefore, Congress's
findings are not entitled to binding deference and an exception to
preserve the health of the mother is still necessary.27
18. Id. at 1012.
19. Id. at 1013; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536
(1997).
20. Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1013.
21. Id. at 1013-14.
22. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1174 (9th Cir. 2006).
23. Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 814 (D. Neb. 2004).
24. Id. at 809.
25. Id. at 1007.
26. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1026, 1115
(N.D. Cal. 2004).
27. See id. at 1048; Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1007.
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The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision. 8 Like the district court in Planned
Parenthood v. Ashcroft, the court viewed the health exception as a
"per se constitutional rule" and when a consensus does not exist, the
29law must err on the side of protecting the woman. Furthermore, the
court noted that whether a medical consensus exists is a question of
law and not a question of fact, requiring de novo review. When an
appellate court conducts a de novo review, it determines whether the
lower court's conclusion (in this case, Congress's conclusion) is
supported by the evidence on record.31 Therefore, no deference at all is
given to those conclusions in a particular case. 32 If "substantial
medical authority" does not support the need for a health exception,
then none is required.33 However, since the record in Carhart, which is
similar to the record in Stenberg, shows substantial medical
disagreement about the necessity of the abortion procedure, a health
exception is necessary.
34
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to
consider the constitutional validity of the Partial Birth Abortion Ban
Act of 2003 and whether to uphold the permanent injunctions against
its enforcement issued by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits.
35
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the
right of a woman to obtain an abortion subject to state regulation,
provided the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest. 36 The Court has recognized two compelling interests held by
the state in regulating abortion: (1) protecting the life and health of the
mother, and (2) protecting the potential life of the fetus.37 In addition,
the regulation must not place an undue burden on the woman, meaning
the regulation must not create a substantial obstacle in the path of
28. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 792 (8th Cir. 2005).
29. Id. at 796.
30. Id. at 797-98.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 798.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 803.
35. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1620 (2007).
36. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 929, 932 (1992); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
37. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
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obtaining an abortion. 38 Finally, Court precedent requires that laws
regulating methods of abortion that may be necessary to preserve the
health of the mother contain an exception for those circumstances.
39
The courts are empowered to review congressional actions and
findings. 40 However, when Congress makes predictive judgments or
draws conclusions based on complex economic evidence, the courts
accord Congress substantial deference, recognizing that Congress has
superior fact-finding abilities and is better equipped to analyze vast
amounts of information.4' In those situations, then, a court declines to
substitute its own judgment for that of Congress's. 42 On the other
hand, the courts are far less inclined to defer to Congress when
Congress attempts to alter a constitutional interpretation issued by the
Supreme Court in a previous case, even if Congress produces
"findings" to support its action.43 Whether courts will defer to
congressional findings, then, turns on the nature of the issue at hand.
A. Abortion Regulation and the Requirement of a Health Exception
In the landmark decision of Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court
held that a Texas law that almost completely banned abortion violated
a woman's "fundamental right" to privacy under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.44 The Court set out a trimester
system for abortion regulation, with a different rule for each of the
three trimesters. 45 In the first trimester, the state may not ban or closely
regulate abortion since the state has no compelling interest in
protecting the mother's health during this time.46 In the second
trimester, the state may regulate abortion to protect the mother's life or
health, since the risk of injury is greater. Finally, the state has a
compelling interest during the third trimester in protecting the health
of the mother and the life of the fetus, since the fetus is viable during
38. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876-77.
39. Id. at 879; Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
40. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
41. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 11), 520 U.S. 180, 196 (1997); Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner1), 512 U.S. 622, 665-66 (1994).
42. See Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 666.
43. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 564, 567 (1995).
44. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 122, 164 (1973).
45. Id. at 164-65.
46. Id. at 164.
47. Id.
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48this time. This means that the State may closely regulate, or even
ban, abortion during the third trimester. 9 However, the regulation
must include an exception for circumstances where the procedure is
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
50
Since Roe, the Court has clarified its decision through a
number of other abortion rights cases.51 One such case is Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, which considered the Pennsylvania Abortion
Control Act.52 The Pennsylvania law required (1) that a woman
seeking an abortion give her informed consent and undergo a 24-hour
waiting period after receiving certain information; (2) that a minor
secure consent from her parents prior to obtaining an abortion; and (3)
that a married woman's husband consent to the procedure.53 All three
requirements were subject to a "medical emergency" exception. 54 The
Court upheld the informed consent and parental consent requirements,
but struck down the spousal consent requirement as an
unconstitutional "undue burden" on the woman's right to choose.55
In reaching this conclusion, the Casey Court reaffirmed the
"essential holding" of Roe, which it found to embody three principles:
(1) "a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an
abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference
from the State;" (2) any state regulation on post-viability abortion must
contain exceptions for when the life or health of the woman is in
danger; and (3) from the beginning of the pregnancy, the State has
legitimate interests in protecting the health of the woman and the
potential life of the fetus. 56 The Court held that the decisions since Roe
had not given enough weight to the State's interest in protecting the
potential life of the fetus. Therefore, Casey's undue burden standard
replaced Roe's trimester approach. 58 This new standard allows a state
to impose regulations on abortion procedures at any time during the
pregnancy, in order to protect the health of the mother and the
48. Id. at 164-65.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992); Thornburgh v.
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986).
52. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 882, 885, 898-900.
56. Id. at 846.
57. Id. at 871.
58. Id. at 873, 875.
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potential life of the fetus, as long as they do not place an undue burden
on the woman.
59
The issue of partial birth abortion came to the fore in Stenberg
v. Carhart. The Supreme Court held that where an abortion
procedure is safer for the mother in some circumstances, the State may
not completely ban the procedure without an exception for the health
and life of the mother.6 1 In Stenberg, a Nebraska doctor who
performed clinical abortions sought an injunction against enforcement
of a state statute that criminalized a partial birth abortion procedure
called dilation and extraction ("D&X"), except when the procedure is
necessary to save the life of the mother. 62 The Court struck down the
statute for the lack of a health exception, among other reasons, 63 and
held that when "significant medical authority supports the proposition
that in some circumstances, D&X would be the safest procedure," as
the trial record in this and other cases indicated, then a health
exception is required.64 Although Nebraska claimed that it had
evidence showing that D&X is never necessary to preserve the health
of the mother, the Court pointed out that "the division of medical
opinion about the matter at most means uncertainty, a factor that
signals the presence of risk, not its absence." 65 Only when a state can
show that a procedure is never necessary to preserve the health of the
mother may it omit a health exception from a statute. 66
B. Judicial Response to Congress
The Supreme Court, in the landmark decision of Marbury v.
Madison, established the doctrine of judicial review, meaning the
Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and scrutinize their
constitutional validity. 67 Oftentimes, crafting legislation involves
analyzing and interpreting vast amounts of facts and data. 68 The Court
recognizes that, of the three branches, Congress is in the best position
to process these facts and reach informed conclusions, especially when
dealing with regulations concerning economically or technologically
59. Id. at 877.
60. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
61. Id. at 938.
62. Id. at921-22.
63. Id. at 937-38.
64. Id. at 932.
65. Id. at 937.
66. Id. at 938.
67. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
68. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994).
2008]
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changing industries.69 Accordingly, the Court in Turner Broadcasting
Systems, Inc. v. FCC demanded that the judiciary afford "substantial
deference to the predictive judgments of Congress. ' 7° This does not
require the courts to unquestioningly defer to congressional judgments
or to forego judicial review of Congress's findings. 71 Instead, the
Court's holding provides that as long as Congress has "drawn
reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence," the courts shall
not disturb congressional findings.7
2
Turner called into question the constitutionality of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 and,
specifically, its "must-carry" provisions. 73 These provisions required
cable operators to carry a specified number of commercial broadcast
and noncommercial educational television stations that requested
carriage.74 After three years of hearings, Congress concluded that
certain aspects of the cable industry were endangering the future
viability of broadcast television stations and the "must-carry"
provisions were vital to their survival.75 The Supreme Court found that
the "must-carry" provisions burdened the cable providers' free speech
rights under the First Amendment and therefore the provisions could
only be justified to the extent they redressed past evils or avoided
future harms.76 Furthermore, Congress must adequately demonstrate
that real harms exist, or potentially exist, through reasonable
legislative findings based on substantial evidence.77 On remand, the
district court was able to expand and develop the factual record and
found the "must-carry" provisions constitutional because Congress
reasonably concluded, based on substantial evidence-including
studies, anecdotal evidence, and data-that the health and survival of
the broadcast industry depended on the "must-carry" provisions. 78 The
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that it is within Congress's authority
to make predictive judgments and that Congress had a substantial
factual basis to support its conclusions.7 9
69. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 520 U.S. 180, 196 (1997).
70. Turner!, 512 U.S. at 665.
71. Id. at 666.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 630.
74. Id. at 630-31.
75. Id. 632-34.
76. Id. at 664.
77. Id. at 664-66.
78. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1l), 520 U.S. 180, 187-88 (1997).
79. Id. at 200; see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1996). In Katzenbach, the
Supreme Court accorded substantial deference to Congress's findings in enacting the Voting
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However, the Court does not always apply this deferential
standard to Congress's conclusions. When Congress attempts to
overrule a Supreme Court decision or supersede a constitutional rule,
the Court is less likely to find that Congress acted within its
constitutional authority. SFor example, the Court in United States v.
Morrison concluded that Congress went beyond its Commerce Clause
power in enacting the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,
notwithstanding congressional findings that gender-motivated violence
substantially impacted interstate commerce. 8 The Court said,
"[s]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity
substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it
so," meaning, the courts make the final determination on that issue.82
Citing its decision in United States v. Lopez, the Court feared that if it
deferred to congressional findings and upheld the Violence Against
Women Act, Congress could effectively remove the constitutional
distinction between national and local power under the authority of the
Commerce Clause.
83
Although Congress may enact legislation to remedy an
undesirable decision in some Supreme Court cases, when the Court
establishes a constitutional rule or interprets constitutional
requirements, Congress may not enact legislation overturning those
decisions. 84 For example, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court
Rights Act of 1965 under the authority of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Act,
which prohibited requiring a person who completed a sixth-grade education at a Spanish-
speaking Puerto Rican school to be able to read and write in English in order to vote,
conflicted with a New York statute which the same requirement. Katezbach, 384 U.S. at 643-
45. In concluding that the Act was appropriate to remedy discrimination in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress weighed various conflicting considerations, including risk
of discrimination, effectiveness of eliminating the New York law as a means of ending
discrimination, and the effect of the legislation on the state's interest. Id. at 653. The Court
held that as long as it could perceive a basis, as it could here, for Congress's factual
conclusions, it would defer to congressional findings. Id.
80. See City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 507 (1997).
81. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614, 617 (2000).
82. Id. at 614.
83. Id. at 617-18.
84. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000); Boerne, 521 U.S. at
536. As another example, in response to the Court's landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona,
which established the requirement that certain warnings be given before a defendant's
statement is admissible in court, Congress enacted a statute that made the admissibility of a
defendant's statement to turn only on whether it was voluntarily made. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at
435-36. This was, of course, in direct conflict with the Miranda rights. Id. at 437. The
Dickerson Court, therefore, struck down the law on the grounds that it superseded the
constitutional rule announced in Miranda. Id. Because the Court was interpreting a
constitutional requirement and not "merely exercise[ing] its supervisory authority to regulate
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declared unconstitutional a law that required courts to apply the strict
scrutiny standard announced in Sherbert v. Verner to any rule of
general applicability that substantially burdens the free exercise of
religion.8 Indeed, the Supreme Court had previously interpreted the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to require that
state justifications for religious classifications survive if they pass a
rational basis test, not the more challenging strict scrutiny test.
86
Whereas the former test merely requires that Congress have a rational
basis for using the classifications, the latter demands Congress
narrowly tailor the classification to serve a compelling state interest,
which is a formidable standard to meet.87 The Court declined to
provide Congress with the power to determine constitutional
standards.
III. COURT'S REASONING
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision in Gonzales v. Carhart,
upheld the constitutionality of the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of
2003 despite the facial attacks lodged against it, and reversed the lower
courts' permanent injunctions against its enforcement. 88 Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, recognized that the Act was passed
in direct response to Stenberg v. Carhart-a 2003 Supreme Court
decision striking down a similar Nebraska partial birth abortion
statute-in two ways.89 First, Congress made factual findings about
the medical necessity of the partial birth abortion procedure. 90 Second,
the language in the Act differs from that in Stenberg in order to clarify
what procedure is actually prohibited. 91 The Gonzales Court also
reaffirmed the three principles set out in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey: (1) women have a right to choose to obtain an abortion prior to
viability without undue interference from the State; (2) the State has
the power to restrict post-viability abortions as long as there is an
exception for those situations where the mother's life or health is in
evidence in the absence of congressional direction," Congress was not permitted to disturb the
Court's decision. Id.
85. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511-13.
86. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885-86
(1990).
87. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963).
88. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1619 (2007).
89. Id. at 1624.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1624-25.
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danger; and (3) the State has legitimate interests in protecting the
health of the woman and the potential life of the fetus.
92
Addressing the lack of the health exception in the Act, the
Court acknowledged that the Act would impose an unconstitutional
burden on the woman's right to obtain an abortion if "substantial
medical authority supports the proposition that banning a particular
procedure could endanger women's health. 9 3 Respondents presented
evidence that intact D&X, which the Act prohibits, is the safest
abortion procedure since it reduces the risk of cervical laceration, and
requires less time, less passes into the uterus, and no removal of fetal
body parts, as in other abortion procedures. 94 Other doctors who
testified before Congress, however, concluded that the health
advantages were not supported by scientific studies and were merely
speculative. 
9 5
Nonetheless, the Court opined that the Act can survive medical
uncertainty since Congress is given wide discretion to pass legislation
to advance legitimate interests. 96 By allowing the Act to stand in the
face of medical uncertainty, the Court renounced the interpretation of
Stenberg that leaves no room for disagreement in the medical
community. 97 Rather, the Court said that Stenberg allows Congress to
balance the risks when crafting regulation to achieve legitimate ends.
98
Congress's discretion, however, is not accorded absolute deference;
the Court retains the power to review congressional findings of fact.99
Here, however, there was a sufficient basis for Congress to conclude
that the Act does not need a health exception because the prohibited
procedure is never medically necessary to preserve the health of the
mother. 10
0
Finally, the majority concluded that a facial attack on the
constitutionality of the Act was not appropriate in the first place.
01
Rather, the Act is better addressed through as-applied challenges, even
if they are pre-enforcement challenges, since the respondents had not
shown that the Act would be unconstitutional in a "large fraction of
92. Id. at 1626.
93. Id. at 1635, 38.
94. Id. at 1635.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1636.
97. Id. at 1638.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1637.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1638.
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relevant cases." 10 2 The relevant cases include not just those where the
woman's doctor determines her health is in danger, but in all those
cases where a woman seeks to obtain the prohibited procedure. 10 3 In
contrast to a facial challenge, as-applied challenges more fully
quantify and analyze the medical risk of the ban. 1
04
Although joining the Court's majority opinion, Justice Thomas,
joined by Justice Scalia, wrote separately to express his view that the
Court's abortion jurisprudence, such as Casey and Roe, has no
constitutional basis. 10 5 He also questioned Congress's power to enact
the legislation under its Commerce Clause authority, even though the
issue was not presented below. 1
06
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Breyer, and
Souter, dissented, criticizing the majority for upholding an abortion
ban that lacked a health exception for a procedure which the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists deemed necessary in
certain cases. 10 7 The Casey Court affirmed women's right to take part
in the economic and social life of the nation and the corresponding
right to reproductive choice. 108 To prevent unduly burdening that right,
the state must provide an exception to preserve the health of the
mother in any abortion regulation, including not only when the
pregnancy itself presents the danger, but also where the woman must
seek less safe methods of abortion because of the law. 109 Since the
Stenberg Court, when confronted with a division in medical opinion,
requires a health exception where "substantial medical authority
supports the proposition that banning a particular abortion procedure
could endanger women's health," the Gonzales dissent argued that a
health exception is required in the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of
2003.110
Furthermore, although Congress concluded that substantial
medical authority shows that the prohibited procedure is never
medically necessary, the dissent pointed out that these findings "do not
withstand inspection."' Indeed, many of the findings are factually
102. Id. at 1638-39.
103. Id. at 1639.
104. Id.
105. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 1640.
107. Id. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1642.
110. Id. at 1642-43.
111. Id. at 1643.
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incorrect. l l2 For instance, Congress found that no medical schools
teach intact D&E.1 3 However, there are numerous schools that do
teach the procedure, including Cornell, Yale, New York University,
and University of Chicago.' 4 Congress concluded that a medical
consensus exists that the banned procedure is never medically
necessary. 1 5 However, the Congressional Record clearly supports the
opposite conclusion.116
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg pointed to the district court trials,
which provided much more evidence concerning the medical necessity
of the banned procedure, with both sides presenting their best experts
and scientific evidence." 7 Medical experts at the trial testified that
intact D&X is, in fact, a safer procedure for women in some
circumstances and is necessary to preserve the health of the mother in
certain cases. 118 For example, women who suffer from certain medical
conditions such as uterine scarring, heart disease, or weakened
immune systems would benefit from the many safety advantages of
intact D&X.119 In fact, after reviewing the trial evidence, both district
courts found Congress's conclusions unreasonable and unsupported by
the evidence. 12 In contrast, the courts concluded that "significant
medical authority supports the proposition that in some circumstances,
intact D&E is the safest procedure."' 2' Therefore, a health exception is
necessary. 12 2 The Supreme Court, argued Justice Ginsburg, should
respect the lower courts' findings and conclusions. 23 Instead, the
majority rejected them. 124
Justice Ginsburg also argued that a facial attack on the lack of a
health exception is permissible, since the Act burdens all women for
whom the health exception is relevant, namely those whose doctors
determine intact D&X is the safest abortion procedure for them. 125
This is the relevant class of women, not all the women who seek an
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1643-44.
115. Id. at 1644.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1644-45.
120. Id. at 1645.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1642.
123. Id. at 1646.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1651.
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abortion.126 For this reason, she argued, the majority mistakenly
upheld the Act against the facial attack on it because was not shown
that the ban would be unconstitutional in a large fraction of the
cases.
127
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court, in Gonzales v. Carhart, upheld the Partial
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, even though it lacked a health
exception that is required by earlier abortion jurisprudence. 8 For the
purposes of a health exception, the Act is identical to the Nebraska
statute that the Court struck down in Stenberg v. Carhart just seven
years earlier. 129 The difference between Stenberg and Gonzales is that
after Stenberg, Congress held hearings and made certain findings,
concluding that there is a consensus among the medical community
that D&X is never necessary to preserve the health of the mother and
ought to be banned. 130 The Court, however, inappropriately deferred to
these congressional findings. As the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia said,
We know of no support.., for the proposition that if
the constitutionality of a statute depends in part on the
existence of certain facts, a court may not review a
legislature's judgment that the facts exist. If a
legislature could make a statute constitutional simply
by "finding" that black is white or freedom, slavery,
judicial review would be an elaborate farce. At least
since Marbury v. Madison, that has not been the law.
131
The Supreme Court should have rejected Congress's findings
either because (A) Congress attempted to change an interpretation of a
constitutional requirement regarding abortion regulation made by the
Court in earlier cases; or, alternatively (B) the findings offered by
Congress were unreasonable and contradicted the very Congressional
Record from which Congress drew its conclusions.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973).
129. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921-22 (2000).
130. See Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2, 117 Stat.
1201, 1201, 1206-07 (2003).
131. Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 392 n.2 (1992) (internal citations omitted).
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A. The Court Allowed Congress to Change a Constitutional
Interpretation of the Court in Roe v. Wade and its Progeny.
Justice Marshall, in the landmark decision of Marbury v.
Madison, said that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law 'is., 132 When the Supreme
Court interprets the Constitution, Congress may not substitute its
judgment for the Court's by passing a law altering the Court's
interpretation. 133 In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court interpreted the
Constitution as requiring a health exception in a ban on a particular
abortion procedure when that procedure is necessary to preserve the
health of the mother. 134 The Court reaffirmed this requirement in
subsequent cases, most recently in Stenberg v. Carhart. By passing
the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, which bans the intact
dilation and extraction procedure (D&X) and is without a health
exception, 13 6 Congress sought to change the substantive requirements
of the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Since this is
inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court
should not have allowed Congress to successfully pass the Act by
upholding it as a constitutional exercise of Congress's legislative
prerogative.
The Supreme Court defeated Congress's attempt to alter a
Court interpretation of the Constitution in City of Boerne v. Flores.137
Boerne challenged Congress's power to enact the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which applied a standard of strict
scrutiny to any law of general applicability that substantially burdened
religious exercise.1 38 This test came from Sherbert v. Verner, a
previous Supreme Court decision that struck down a state law that
denied unemployment compensation to a woman who refused to work
on a Saturday because of her religious beliefs.139 The Court held that
the state may not substantially burden religious exercise without a
compelling state interest. 14° However, the Supreme Court in
Employment Division v. Smith, which reviewed a refusal of
132. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
133. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000).
134. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973).
135. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938 (2000); see also Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
136. Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (Supp. III 2003).
137. City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
138. Id. at515.
139. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399-401 (1963).
140. Id. at 403.
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unemployment compensation because the plaintiffs broke a generally
applicable criminal law proscribing drug use when they ingested
sacramental peyote, declined to apply the Sherbert test.141 The Court
ultimately upheld the state law denying unemployment compensation
to the plaintiffs. 1
42
The Court's decision in Smith created a whirlwind of
controversy. Many members of Congress believed that the Court
should have applied the Sherbert strict scrutiny test. Congress passed
RFRA in direct response to the Smith decision, citing Sherbert and
requiring the Court to apply strict scrutiny to all future cases dealing
with neutral, generally applicable laws that substantially burden
religious exercise. 143 The Boerne Court, however, struck RFRA down
as an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power. 44 Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, said that while Congress at times
has the power to interpret the meaning of the Constitution when
discharging its legislative duties, it may not enact any laws that are
contrary to an interpretation of the Constitution issued by the Supreme
Court.145 Since the Smith Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause as
not requiring a compelling state interest in all cases where free
religious exercise is burdened, and RFRA attempted to substantively
alter that constitutional interpretation, RFRA was not within
Congress's power.146
Similar to RFRA, Congress passed the Partial Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003 in direct response to the Court's 2000 decision in
Stenberg v. Carhart.147 The Stenberg Court struck down a Nebraska
law banning D&X in part because of the lack of a health exception
required by previous Court decisions.148 The Court opined that, since
the record shows that "significant medical authority" found D&X to be
the safest abortion procedure in some circumstances, the law needed to
include an exception for the health of the mother. 49 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied on medical testimony presented in the
district court as well as Nebraska's evidence about the safety of
141. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-85
(1990).
142. Id. at 890.
143. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515.
144. Id. at 536.
145. Id. at 535-36.
146. Id.
147. Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2, 117 Stat. 1201,
1201-02 (2003).
148. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938 (2000).
149. Id. at 932.
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D&X. 150 Three years later, Congress enacted the Partial Birth Abortion
Ban Act, stating that while the Supreme Court in Stenberg deferred to
district court findings about the safety of D&X, Congress was not
required to do the same. 151 After conducting hearings and
investigations about the necessity of D&X, Congress concluded that
"[a] moral, medical, and ethical consensus exists that the practice of
performing a partial-birth abortion.., is a gruesome and inhumane
procedure that is never medically necessary .... ,,5 In banning D&X,
Congress declined to provide an exception for the health of the
mother. 153 The Court in Gonzales upheld the Act as a constitutional
exercise of congressional legislative power.1
54
The Gonzales Court should not have allowed Congress to
successfully pass the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act. The Act
purposefully changed a Supreme Court interpretation of the
constitutional protections from state abortion regulation afforded to
pregnant women.1 55 The health exception requirement was first
established in Roe v. Wade, where the Court held that the State may
regulate and even proscribe abortion except where the procedure is
"necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of
the life or health of the mother. ' 5 Nineteen years later, in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this holding of the
Roe Court. 157 In neither of these cases did the Court afford Congress
any discretion in determining if a health exception is necessary, but
rather just stated that one is required. 158 In fact, the Roe Court said that
the Texas law in question in that case could not withstand the
constitutional attack lodged against it since it allows abortions only in
circumstances where an abortion is necessary to save the mother's
life.159 Notably, the Partial Birth Abortion Act allows D&X solely in
that very circumstance, as well. 1
60
150. Id. at 932-38.
151. Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2, 117 Stat. 1201,
1201-02 (2003).
152. Id. at 1201.
153. Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (Supp. III 2003).
154. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1639 (2007).
155. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 931 (2000); Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2, 117 Stat. 1201, 1201-02 (2003).
156. Roev. Wade, 410U.S. 113, 165 (1973).
157. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
158. See id.; Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.
159. Roe, 410U.S. at 164.
160. Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (Supp. III 2003).
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If it is indeed the duty of the judicial branch to say what the
law is, as Marbury held, then the Supreme Court's constitutional
interpretation of a health exception requirement for abortion regulation
should prevail against contrary expectations promulgated by Congress.
However, as a consequence of the Gonzales decision, this is no longer
the case. The Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, which asserted that an
exception to preserve the health of the mother is not necessary, is
inconsistent with previous Court decisions. 161 This violates the
principle of separation of powers by intruding on the judicial branch's
power to interpret the law and the Constitution. 162 Therefore, the Act
should have been struck down as unconstitutional.
B. Even If a Health Exception Relies on a Factual Determination of
Whether Such an Exception is Necessary, the Court Failed to
Recognize that Congress's Findings Did Not Pass Even the Most
Lenient Standard of Review.
The Supreme Court has long recognized Congress's superior
ability to engage in fact-finding and analyze vast amounts of
information. Generally, when it comes to predicting future impact or
conclusions regarding economic regulations, the Court accords a
substantial amount of deference to Congress's findings. 164 In these
cases, the Court may not review the findings de novo or substitute its
own judgment for that of Congress's. 165 This deference, however, is
not without limit. 66 The Court makes clear that congressional findings
are subject to some judicial scrutiny in that courts must conclude that
Congress "Jdrew] reasonable inferences based on substantial
evidence."' 6 Therefore, if Congress had a reasonable basis on which
to make the conclusions it did, then courts will accept those
findings. 1
68
161. Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2, 117 Stat. 1201,
1203 (2003).
162. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
163. E.g. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I1), 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997); Walters
v. Nat'l Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330 n.12 (1985); Rosteker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981).
164. See e.g. Turner l, 520 U.S. at 196; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512
U.S. 622, 665 (1994).
165. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 666.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. E.g. Turner l, 520 U.S. at 199-200.
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The Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 was a direct
response to the Court's decision in Stenberg v. Carhart.169 In striking
down the Nebraska law, the majority relied on evidence presented in
the district court that showed intact D&X may be the safest abortion
procedure in some circumstances. 170 The Court said that "where
substantial medical authority supports the proposition that banning a
particular abortion procedure could endanger women's health, Casey
requires the statute to include a health exception .... ,7 Indeed,
disagreement with those medical professionals that assert the necessity
of a particular procedure does not prove that those professionals are172
wrong.
Congress, in response to the outcome of Stenberg, proceeded to
conduct hearings and investigations about the medical necessity of
D&X.173 Since Congress unsuccessfully tried to pass a similar ban
under the Clinton Administration, it had evidence from legislative
hearings in the 104th, 105th, 106th, 107th, and 108th Congresses.
174
From that evidence, Congress concluded, in part, that a health
exception is not necessary because the procedure, D&X, is never
necessary to preserve the health of the mother. 75 Furthermore,
Congress asserted that "[a] moral, medical, and ethical consensus
exists that the practice of performing a partial-birth abortion ... should
be prohibited."'' 76 The Court should not have deferred to these
"findings" because they are unreasonable according to Congress's own
record.
The Congressional Record shows that a medical consensus
does not exist as to the necessity of the partial birth abortion
procedure, D&X. 177 Even Dr. Mark G. Nerrhof, who testified before
the House Subcommittee on the Constitution on March 25, 2003, in
support of the Act said that "some clinicians have considered intact
D&X necessary when hydrocephalus is present."'' 78 Among the
169. Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2, 117 Stat. 1201,
1201-02 (2003).
170. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 932 (2000).
171. Id. at 938.
172. Id. at 937.
173. Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2, 117 Stat. 1201,
1202, 1204 (2003).
174. Id. at 1204.
175. Id. at 1203.
176. Id. at 1201.
177. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1026 (N.D. Cal.
2004).
178. Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 108"h Cong. 7 (2003).
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numerous other physicians Congress heard from during its debates was
Vanessa Cullins, M.D., a board-certified OBGYN and member of
National Medical Association (NMA), the American Medical
Association (AMA), and the American College of Obstetrics and
Gynecologists (ACOG), who said that D&X carries significant health
advantages over other abortion procedures performed during the same
time period, including less risk of tears in the uterus and cervix, less
time, and a reduced risk that fetal matter will be left in the uterus.
179
Felicia H. Stewart, M.D., co-director for the Center for Reproductive
Health Research and Policy at the University of California, San
Francisco, testified in opposition to the Act, saying that doctors must
be given wide discretion to choose the safest possible method of
abortion to avoid risk of infertility, coma, stroke, infection, and brain,
liver, or kidney damage.' The Kansas Department of Health and
Environment presented statistics that showed that of the "partial-birth"
procedures performed, every one of them was necessary to "prevent
substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function."' 81
Similarly, several medical groups rose up in opposition to the
Act for its lack of a health exception.' 82 The American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists posited that, although a select panel
could not identify a situation where intact D&X would be the only
procedure to preserve the health of the mother, the patient's doctor,
weighing the woman's unique circumstances, might decide that it is
the safest. 183 The American Medical Women's Association, which is
composed of ten thousand women physicians and medical students,
argued the Act is "unconscionable" because D&X "is the safest and
most appropriate alternative available to save the life and health of the
woman."1, Other medical groups that opposed the Act include the
American Medical Association, 18 5 the American Public Health
179. Id. at 187-88.
180. 149 Cong. Rec. S12914, S12923 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2003) (letter from Felicia H.
Stewart, M.D.).
181. 149 Cong. Rec. S3456, S3471-72 (daily ed. March 11, 2003) (citing the case of
Coreen Costello).
182. E.g. 149 Cong. Rec. S3456, S3479 (daily ed. March 11, 2003); 149 Cong. Rec.
S12914, S12921 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2003); 149 Cong. Rec. S3456, S3460 (daily ed. March 11,
2003).
183. 149 Cong. Rec. S3456, S3479-80 (daily ed. March 11, 2003).
184. 149 Cong. Rec. S12914, S12921 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2003).
185. 149 Cong. Rec. S3456, S3460 (daily ed. March 11, 2003) ("The AMA also has
long-standing policy opposing legislation that would criminalize medical practice or
procedure .... [T]he AMA does not support this bill.").
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Association, 186 and ethnic groups such as the National Latina Institute
for Reproductive Health.18
In addition to testimony from doctors and medical
professionals, Congress heard the tragic stories of numerous women
whose doctors advised them to undergo an intact D&X procedure to
protect their health.188 For example, Coreen Costello shared her
experience with D&X when she was seven months pregnant with her
daughter, Katherine Grace. 89 When the doctors told her that Katherine
was dying due to a neurological disorder and that fluid was puddling in
Mrs. Costello's uterus, the Costellos were devastated.1 90 Nevertheless,
they refused to terminate the pregnancy. 19 1 Rather, they would induce
labor and try to make Katherine's short life (she would die within
moments of birth) as comfortable as possible.' 9 However, because of
Katherine's position in her mother's uterus as well as the amount of
swelling of Katherine's head, natural delivery or induction was not
possible. 193 All of Mrs. Costello's doctors, believing the risks of a C-
section were too great, advised her to undergo an intact D&X
abortion. 194 Had Katherine's heart not stopped beating half-way
through the procedure, an incident which was completely
unanticipated and unforeseeable, that procedure would have been
illegal under the Act. 1
95
Notwithstanding all the evidence in favor of a health exception
for the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Congress declared that
it "found" a consensus that so-called partial-birth abortion is never
medically necessary to preserve the health of the mother and should be
banned. The Congressional Record, however, clearly shows that no
such consensus exists. Those who testified against the Act are
legitimate and respected physicians and, representatives of medical
186. 149 Cong. Rec. S11589, S11596-97 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2003) ("APHA...oppose[s]
the bill because it fails to include adequate health exception language in instances where
certain procedures may be determined by a physician to be the best or most appropriate to
preserve the health of the woman.").
187. 149 Cong. Rec. S12927, S12938 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2003).
188. E.g. 149 Cong. Rec. S3456, S3460-61 (daily ed. March 11, 2003); 149 Cong. Rec.
S3560, S3592-93 (daily ed. March 12, 2003).
189. 149 Cong. Rec. S3456, S3460 (daily ed. March 11, 2003).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at S3461.
195. Id.
196. Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2, 117 Stat. 1201,
1201 (2003).
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organizations. 19 7 Certainly, there were also many physicians and
medical organization representatives that testified in favor of the
Act. 198 However, as Justice Breyer stated in Stenberg, "the division of
medical opinion about [the necessity of the D&X procedure] at most
means uncertainty, a factor that signals the presence of risk, not its
absence."' 199 Therefore, the Court should not have accepted as
reasonable Congress's conclusions.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart upheld the Partial
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, signed into law by President George
W. Bush.2 °° In so doing, it accepted Congress's factual conclusions
that the banned procedure, D&X, is never medically necessary to
preserve the health of the mother, which the Court argues is the only
way an abortion ban without a health exception can pass constitutional
muster.201 However, the Court should not have accorded such great
deference to congressional findings. First, since the health exception
requirement articulated by Roe v. Wade is an interpretation of a
constitutional requirement made by the Court, the Court should not
have allowed Congress to substantively change that constitutional
interpretation by abolishing the need for a health exception.
20 2
Alternatively, even if the health exception is not a "constitutional
fact," Congress's findings do not withstand even the most lenient
scrutiny-that Congress came to reasonable conclusions based on
"substantial evidence. ' 2°3 Therefore, the Supreme Court should have
197. E.g. 149 Cong. Rec. S3456, S3479-80 (daily ed. March 11, 2003) (letter from the
ACOG); 149 Cong. Rec. S12914, S12921 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2003) (letter from the American
Medical Women's Association, Inc.); 149 Cong. Rec. S3456, S3460 (daily ed. March 11,
2003) (letter from the American Medical Association); Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003,
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong.
187-88 (2003) (prepared statement by Dr. Vanessa Cullins).
198. E.g. Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 6-8 (2003) (oral testimony and
prepared statement of Dr. Mark G. Neerhof); Id. at 80-86 (prepared statement of Kathi A.
Aultman, M.D.); Id. at 88-94 (prepared statement by Curtis Cook, M.D.); 149 Cong. Rec.
S3456, S3470 (daily ed. March 11, 2003) (Letter from Physicians' Ad Hoc Coalition for Truth
(PHACT)).
199. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 936 (2000).
200. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1639 (2007).
201. See id. at 1635.
202. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
203. See e.g. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994).
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struck down the Act as unconstitutional for lack of an exception for
preservation of the health of the mother.

